Articles 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362 & 363

By: Jay R. Bautista

Article 356. Every child:
(1) Is entitled to parental care;
(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;
(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian;
(4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and intellectual development.

Article 357. Every child shall:
(1) Obey and honor his parents or guardian;
(2) Respect his grandparents, old relatives, and persons holding substitute parental authority;
(3) Exert his utmost for his education and training;
(4) Cooperate with the family in all matters that make for the good of the same.

Article 358. Every parent and every person holding substitute parental authority shall see to it that the rights of the child are respected and his duties complied with, and shall particularly, by precept and example, imbue the child with high mindedness, love of country, veneration for the national heroes, fidelity to democracy as a way of life,
and attachment to the ideal of permanent world peace.

Article 359. The government promotes the full growth of the faculties of every child. For this purpose, the government will establish, whenever possible:
(1) Schools in every barrio, municipality and city where optional religious instruction shall be taught as part of the curriculum at the option of the parent or guardian;
(2) Puericulture and similar centers;
(3) Councils for the Protection of Children; and
(4) Juvenile courts.

Article 360. The Council for the Protection of Children shall look after the welfare of children in the municipality. It shall, among other functions:
(1) Foster the education of every child in the municipality;
(2) Encourage the cultivation of the duties of parents;
(3) Protect and assist abandoned or mistreated children, and orphans;
(4) Take steps to prevent juvenile delinquency;
(5) Adopt measures for the health of children;
(6) Promote the opening and maintenance of playgrounds;
(7) Coordinate the activities of organizations devoted to the welfare of children, and secure their cooperation.

Article 361. Juvenile courts will be established, as far as practicable, in every chartered city
or large municipality.

Article 362. Whenever a child is found delinquent by any court, the father, mother, or guardian may in a proper case be judicially admonished.

Article 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latter’s welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure.

The name of an individual has two parts:

(1) the given or proper name and

(2) the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is givento the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifi es the family to which he belongs and is continued
from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.

A name is said to have the following characteristics:

(1)It is absolute, intended to protect the individual from being confused with others.

(2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a name.

(3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and maybe changed only
for good cause and by judicial proceedings.

(4) It is outside thecommerce of man, and therefore inalienable and intransmissible
by act inter vivos or mortis causes.

(5) It is imprescriptible

Middle names have a practical and legal significance in that they serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him or her from others who may have the same given name and surname as he or she has.
A middle name cannot just be dropped without compelling or justifiable reasons. It cannot be dropped merely because it is an inconvenience to the person using it.

Case Digest:

Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of Entry in the Civil Registry of
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, G.R. No. 159966, March 30, 2005, 454 SCRA 155

FACTS:

Julian was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.

Since the couple planned to live in Singapore where Julian will study together with a sister who was born in Singapore, Anna Lisa decided to file a petition in the Regional Trial Court seeking to drop his middle name and have his registered name in the Civil Registry changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The reason given for the change of name sought in the petition is that Julian may be discriminated against when he studies in Singapore because of his middle name since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother is not carried in a person’s name.

After trial, the RTC denied the petition because the reason given did not fall within the grounds recognized by law. The RTC ruled that since the State has an interest in the name of a person it cannot just be changed to suit the convenience of the bearer of the name. The RTC said that legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right should be taken from Julio considering that he was still a minor. When he reaches majority age he could then decide whether to change his name by dropping his middle name, added the RTC.

ISSUE:

Was the RTC correct in denying the petition?

HELD:

Yes. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. When an illegitimate child is legitimated by subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public instrument or private handwritten instrument, he then bears both his mother’s surname as his middle name and his father’s surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged natural child. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given name, a middle name and a surname.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.

To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.

In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws. (In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of Entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang G.R. 159966, March 30 2005, 454 SCRA 2155).

Article 122

By: Jay R. Bautista

The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefi t of the family.

Neither shall the fi nes and indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.

However, the payment of the personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of fi nes and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insuffi cient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned. (163a)

DEBTS, FINES, PECUNIARY INDEMNITIES INCURRED BEFORE OR DURING THE MARRIAGE

For as long as debts and obligations redounded to the benefit of the family, such debts and obligations may be charge to the conjugal property

Example : Hospital and medical expenses of the spouses

When the separate property of the spouse is insufficient. Under the absolute community regime, such liabilities may be charged against the community only in case the separate property of the spouse is insufficient.

The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make payment in advance for the liability of the spouse-debtor which shall be reimbursed or paid at the time of liquidation. In so far as debts are concerned,

the third paragraph of Article 122 clearly limits the application of this advance-reimbursement mechanism to personal debts not redounding to the benefit of the family contracted by either of the spouses before the marriage and not during the marriage.

 

Articles 37,38 and 39

By : Rossville “Aeron” B. Violanta

CIVIL PERSONALITY

Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.

Kinds of Capacity. – Capacity may be (1) juridical capacity, and (2) capacity to act. The union of these two forms the full civil capacity.

*Juridical capacity is synonymous to legal capacity and to personality. These terms are, therefore, used interchangeably in the law. They all refer to the aptitude for the holding and enjoyment of rights. Juridical capacity is indivisible, irreducible, and essentially the same for all men; it is an inherent and ineffaceable attribute of man, and attaches to him by the mere fact of his being a man. It is acquired upon birth and there are some cases that even the child is still unborn he is already given provisional personality and it is terminated upon death.

* Capacity to act is the aptitude for the exercise of rights, and is often referred to merely as “capacity.” In this sense, it is broadly defined as “the ability, power, qualification, or competency of persons, natural or artificial, for the performance of civil acts depending on their state or condition (status) as defined or fixed by law”. Capacity to act is conditional and variable. It is acquired and may be lost. The mere existence of a man is not sufficient to confer capacity to act, because this capacity requires both intelligence and will; and since these are not always present in all men, nor are they always of the same degree, the law in some cases denies this capacity and in others limits it.

            Juridical capacity can exist without the capacity to act, but the existence of the latter implies that of the former. They do not always coincide.

Art. 38. Minority,insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements.

Case Digest

 The causes of incapacity enumerated in this article are minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality, and civil interdiction. However, these are not the only causes of incapacity. Some of them are mentioned in the next article, such as family relations, alienage, absence, insolvency, and trusteeship. Others are to be found in the Rules of Court and other legal provisions.

*Minority. – The age of majority commences upon the attainment of the age of 18 years (R.A. 6809); a person bellow such age is a minor, and has a limited capacity to act. The unemancipated minor cannot enter into contracts; but he may be estopped from disavowing his contract if he has misled the other party as to his age.

The mere fact that one month after the execution of the contract, the minor informed the other contracting party of his minority, does not affect the case; such subsequent information is of no moment, because his previous misrepresentation has already estopped him from disavowing the contract.

*Insanity or Imbecility. – Insanity includes the various forms of mental disease, either inherited or acquired, in which there is a perversion of the mentality, as when the person is suffering from illusions, hallucinations, or delusions, unnatural exaltation or depression, or insane ideas of persecution or power. Various phases of insanity are known as dementia praecox, paranoia, schizophrenia, mania, melancholia, etc. It is a manifestation, in language or conduct, of disease or defect of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or organic, characterized by perversion, inhibition, or disordered function of the sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition.

An insane person cannot make a valid will or testament and he cannot validly give consent to contracts.

*Deaf-Mutism. – The old rule that a deaf-mute was presumed to be an idiot no longer prevails; such persons are now considered as capable of entering into contracts if shown to have sufficient mental capacity. A deaf-mute can make a valid will, so long as its contents have been communicated or made known to him in some practicable manner. But when the deaf-mute does not know how to read and write, he cannot give consent to contracts and he cannot personally accept or repudiate an inheritance.

*Civil Interdiction. – is the legal restrain upon a person incapable of managing his, estate because of mental incapacity from signing any deed. Civil interdiction is an accessory penalty imposed upon persons who are sentenced to a principal penalty not lower than reclusion temporal (article 41, Revised Penal Code), which is a penalty ranging from twelve years and one day to twenty years.

Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code provides: “Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property, and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.”

*Prodigality. – A spendthrift or prodigal is a “person who, by excessive drinking, gambling, idleness or debauchery of any kind shall so spend, waste or lessen his estate as to expose himself or his family to want or suffering” . The acts of prodigality must show a morbid state of mind and disposition to spend, waste and lessen the estate to such an extent as is likely to expose the family to want of support, or to deprive the compulsory heirs of their legitime.

Prodigality in itself does not limit the capacity of a person to act. He may enter into contracts and make wills disposing of his property. There is no specific provision which incapacitates him for any particular act. But he may be placed under guardianship as an incompetent under the provisions of Rule 93, section 2, of the Rules of Court. The moment he is under guardianship, his capacity to act is restricted, because he can only bind himself by contract through his guardian.

Art. 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act : age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of these circumstances are governed in this Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious belief or political opinion.

A married woman, eighteen years (previously twenty-one, as amended by R.A. 6809) of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil life, except in cases specified by law.

Some of the circumstances mentioned in the present article as modifying or limiting capacity to act are already given in the preceding article.

*Family Relations. – Certain family relations limit the capacity of persons for some juridical acts. Ascendants and descendants, brothers and sisters, and collateral relatives within the fourth civil degree (as cousins), cannot validly marry; their marriage would be incestuous or against public policy and void. Husband and wife, during the marriage, cannot give donations to each other were limited by previous constitutions.

*Alienage or Citizenship. – Citizenship may affect the right of persons in matters where the State may validly discriminate between aliens and its citizens for reasons of public policy, without doing violence to the equal protection of the laws. Some of the limitations on the rights of aliens are imposed by the Constitution, and others by statute.

* Absence. – A person is absent when he disappears from his domicile, and his whereabouts are unknown. He cannot properly administer his properties, and so another person is appointed to administer them. Continued absence may even give rise to the presumption of his death (article 390). However, the absentee may be alive somewhere, and, if not otherwise incapacitated, his acts in such other place are perfectly valid. He can even alienate his properties without the knowledge of those who administer them in his domicile, and the alienation would be valid to confer title upon the grantee.

*Insolvency and Trusteeship. – When a person has been adjudicated as an insolvent, his capacity to dispose of his property becomes limited. He cannot dispose of his property existing at the time of the commencement of the insolvency proceedings; and no payments of property or credit can be made to him.

*Physical Condition. – In some cases, the physical condition of a person may limit capacity for certain acts. Thus, physical incapacity to enter into the married state, or impotence, is a ground for annulment of marriage, and a person who is blind, or deaf or dumb, cannot be a witness to the execution of a will.

Article 40, 41, 42 & 43

By Robinson Manaig

NATURAL PERSONS

Art. 40: Commencement of Civil personality

Case Digest Quimiguing vs Icao

Article 40: Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article. (29a)

COMMENCEMENT OF CIVIL PERSONALITY. Article 5 of PD #603, “Child and youth welfare code,” amended article 40 of civil code

The civil personality of the child shall commence from the time of his conception (the beginning of pregnancy) for all purposes favorable to him, subject to the requirements of article 41 of the civil code.

Art. 41: conditions to determine when the child is considered conceived.

Case Digest GELUZ v COURT OF APPEALS

Article 41: for civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb. However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb. (30a)

Art. 42: Civil personality extinguished at death

Case Digest ANGELA M. BUTTE vs. MANUEL UY

Article 42: Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will. (32a)

• Death puts an end to civil personality
• Dead person continues to have personality only through contract, will, or as determined by law.
• Creditors can still claim from the estate of the deceased any obligation due to them.

No human body shall be buried unless the proper death certificate has been presented and recorded however during an epidemic bodies may be buried provided that the death certificate be secured within 5 days after the burial.

 Art. 43: Doubt between the death of two or more persons

Case Digest JOAQUIN VS. NAVARRO

Article 43: if there is doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them who died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there be no transmission of rights from one to the other. (33)

• Applies to persons who are called to succeed each other like mother and child. (Necessary to determine the amount of inheritance one is to receive, transmission of rights, etc.)
• If there is no proof as to who died first, they are presumed to have died at the same time and thus no transmission of rights from one to the other.
• Proof of death cannot be established from mere inference or presumptions. It must be established by clear positive evidence.

Article 44, 45 & 46

ENGR. MARLO PJ ALIPON  REE,RMP,MPA

JURIDICAL PERSONS

Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:

1. The State and its political subdivisions;
2. Other corporations, institutions and entities fro public interest or purpose, created by law;their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
3. Corporations, partnerships and associations for private or public purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder,partner or member.

Art 45. Juridical persons mentioned in nos. 1 and 2nof the preceeding article are governed by the laws creating or recognizing them.

Private corporations are regulated by laws of general application on the  subject.

Partnership and associations for private interest or purpose are governed by the provision of this code concerning partnerships.

Art 46. Juridical persons may acquire and possess proprty of all kinds, as  well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization.

STATE. It is the political organization of the society legally supreme within and independent of legal control from without. Under Article XVI, Section 2 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, As a fundamental rule, the state cannot be sued without its consent.This consent will be given by the state if it enters into a contract with a private entity. More so, If the state exercising the power of eminent domain fails to give just compensation to a property belonging to a private individual or ordinary citizen, the latter are in cases of progression of the government which inevitably requires properties belonging to a Citizen.

Further it is not imperative upon suing the state that the State should be liable for its act which causes the State to be sued. Like any other Individual, the State has also the right to establish its rightful position if there is.

What are Political Subdivision? Basically they are the Municipal Corporation; In the Philippines they are the Provinces, Municipalities and Cities. The latter has two fold functions. In one it can function as Governmental and political act, and on the other hand their  Fucntion can be Private or propriety .

Case Digest

GR No. L-29993; October 23, 1978

TORIO v. FONTANILLA  

FACTS: On October 21, 1978, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed Resolution No. 156 whereby it resolved to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration on January 21, 22, and 23, 1959. Resolution No. 182 was also passed creating the town fiesta committee with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. The amount of P100.00 was also appropriated for the construction of two stages, one for the zarzuela and the other for the cancionan. On January 22, while in the midst of the zarzuela, the stage collapsed, pinning Vicente Fontanilla who died thereafter. The heirs of Fontanilla filed a petition for recovery of damages. Defendant councilors contend that they are merely acting as agents of the municipality.

ISSUE: 1) Is the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a municipal council a governmental or a corporate function of the municipality? 2) Are the councilors liable for the death of Fontanilla?

HELD: The holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality was an exercise of a private or proprietary function of municipality. The provision on Section 2282 of the Revised Administrative Code simply gives authority to the municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. It follows that under the doctrine of respondent-superior, the municipality is held liable for damages for the death of Fontanilla. Since it is established that the municipality was acting a proprietary function, it follows that it stands on the same footing as an ordinary private corporation where officers are not held liable for the negligence of the corporation merely because of their official relation to it. Thus, the municipal councilors are absolved from any criminal liability for they did not directly participated in the defective construction of the stage.

 

Article 47

By Christelle Amil

Art. 47

Upon the dissolution of corporations, institutions and other entities for public interest or purpose mentioned in No. 2 of Article 44, their property and other assets shall be disposed of in pursuance of law or the charter creating them. If nothing has been specified on this point, the property and other assets shall be applied to similar purposes for the benefit of the region, province, city or municipality which during the existence of the institution derived the principal benefits from the same. (39a)

Dissolution Defined

The dissolution of a corporation is the termination of its existence as a legal entity.

No. 2 of Article 44

Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law

Corporations, institutions and other entities for public interest or purpose

Examples of these are:

• Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)
• Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
• Duty Free Philippines
• Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
• Home Development Mutual Fund (Pag-IBIG)
• Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
• Light Rail Transit Authority (LTRA)
• Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), etc.

When do Corporations undergo dissolution?

• voluntary filing of the dissolution because the corporation is incapable of continuing the business
• involuntarily filing of the dissolution through government action as a result of failure to pay tax
• surrender or expiration of its charter
• legal proceedings

Dissolution for Private Corporations

According to Section 40 Title IV of the Corporation Code, a corporation may, by a majority vote of its board of directors sell, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, or dispose all its property and assets, including goodwill.

Articles 48,49, 50 & 51

By Dr. Evelyn Balaoro

Case Digest Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC

The following are citizen of the Philippines:
1.)Those who were citizen of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines;
2.)Those born in the Philippines of foreign parents who, before the adoption of said Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippines;
3.)Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines;
4.)Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect the Philippine Citizenship:
5.)Those who are naturalized in accordance with the law.

Article 49. Naturalization and loss and reacquisition of citizenship of the Philippines are governed by special laws.

Article 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual residence.

Article 51. When the law creating or recognizing them, or any other provision does not fix the domicile of juridical persons, the same shall be understood to be the place where their legal representation is established or where they exercise their principal functions.

Article 13

By Maielle De Lumban

When the law speaks of years, months or nights, it shall be understood that years are of 365 days each; months of 30 days; days of 24 hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise. If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively have.

 In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included.

(82 SCAD 188,271 SCRA 767)

Lynetter Garvida Petitioner

Vs.

Floencio Sales Jr., COMELEC, Election Officer Dionisio Rios & Provincial Supervisor Noli Pipo Respondents

Facts:                   

Lynette Garvida applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte on March 16, 1996.  However, her application was denied by the Board of Election Tellers since she exceeded the age limit. She then filed a “Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataan Member and Voter” with the Municipal Trial Court which was granted by the said court. Then, on April 23, 1996, Garvida filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte. On the same date, Election Officer Dionisio Rios, per advise of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo, disapproved petitioner’s certificate of candidacy again due to her age. Petitioner then appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Filemon Asperin who set aside the order of respondents and allowed petitioner to run. Earlier and without knowledge of COMELEC officials, private respondent and petitioner’s rival Florencio Sales Jr. filed with the COMELEC en banc a “Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy” via facsimile and registered mail on April 29, 1996. And, on May 2, 1996 respondent Riso issued a memorandum to petitioner informing her of her ineligibility and giving hr 24 hours why her certificate of candidacy should not be disapproved. Also on the same date, the COMELEC en banc issued an order directing the Board Election Tellers and Board of Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the event she won in the election. This is why on May 6, 1996, Election Day, Garvida was not proclaimed the winner. She was only proclaimed on June 2, 1996. Said proclamation was “without prejudice to any further action by the Commission on Elections or any other interested parties.

Issues:              

  Whether or not COMELEC erred in the cancellation of her candidacy on the ground that she has exceeded the age limit.

  Whether or not COMELEC en banc acted within its jurisdiction in cancelling her certificate of candidacy.

Ruling:                 

Lynette Garvida is declared ineligible for being over the age qualification for candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan.   The Supreme Court discussed the one year cycle of successive years in construing  Section 428 of the Local Government Code providing that certain elective officials should not be more than 21 years of age on the day of their election..  Only exception is when the official reaches the age of 21 years during his incumbency. Petition Dismissed.